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Direct Broadcast Satellites: FCC Adopts
"Open Skies" Policy For Space Age
Technology
By

JEFF EDWARD JOHNSON*

I
Introduction
Advances in telecommunications techniques have proceeded
at a remarkable rate during the last several generations. While
satellites have been increasingly employed to broadcast programming to radio and television stations and cable television
systems,' the technology now exists to transmit satellite programming directly to individual consumers through the congruence of powerful satellites and small receiving antennae
located at each home.2 This new telecommunications technology is known as the direct broadcast satellite or DBS. 3 The development and authorization of DBS on a national scale poses
some unique problems for the Federal Communications Commission [hereinafter FCC or Commission].
DBS offers numerous potential advantages. It can provide
more television channels to subscribers and thereby, greater
programming diversity. It can provide remote areas currently
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1980.
1. For a thorough discussion of satellite broadcasting in general, including the
current uses of communications satellites, see A. BELENDIUK & S. ROBB, BROADCASTING
VIA SATELLITE: LEGAL AND BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS

(1979).

2. It was less than 40 years ago that science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke
dreamed of a worldwide system of communications satellites broadcasting radio programming to a global audience. Clarke, Extra-TerrestrialRelays - Can Rocket Stations
Give World-Wide Radio Coverage?, WIRELESS WORLD, Oct. 1945, at 305.
3. Direct broadcast satellite service is defined as "A radiocommunication service
in which signals transmitted or retransmitted by space stations are intended for direct
reception by the general public." 47 Fed. Reg. 31574 (1982) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R.
§ 100.3).

See also B.

SIGNITZER, REGULATION OF DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM SATELLITES

7

(1976). "Direct broadcasting from satellites (DBS) implies the elimination of earth
stations and rebroadcast transmitters and the reception of the satellite signal on individual receiving sets."
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receiving poor reception with more adequate television service. In addition, DBS eliminates some problems inherent in
long distance microwave transmission in that it dispenses with
the need for elaborate terrestrial interconnection systems.4
Long distance microwave transmissions can be obstructed by
any solid object, including the curvature of the earth, and
therefore require a system of terrestrial relay stations. As distance from the transmission source increases, reception quality diminishes and transmission costs increase. DBS, on the
other hand, is virtually distance insensitive.' This means that
the satellite signal may be received anywhere within the "footprint"6 of the satellite at essentially the same cost.7 In short,
the opportunities for increased programming diversity, increased reception quality and decreased transmission costs
make DBS an attractive new telecommunications technology.
The FCC has begun the process of promulgating permanent
regulations for the DBS industry by soliciting public comment
on desirable regulatory policies. 8 The FCC's inquiry is devoted
to ensuring the development of regulatory policies that are in
the public interest. The Commission has determined that this
entails the pursuit of three goals:
(1) Efficient use of the spectrum (including the balance between DBS and other services), (2) Opening new channels to
4. See The Development of Video Technology, 25 N.Y.L. SCH.L. REV. 789, 806-807
(1980).
5. See A. BELENDINK & S.ROBB, supra note 1, at 20: "The cost of a satellite circuit
is fundamentally independent of route length; the cost of connecting two terminals one
mile apart is the same as when they are 2,000 miles apart or separated by an ocean."
6. "The portion of the earth covered by the transmitting antenna is called a 'footprint."' The Development of Video Technology, supra note 4, at 801 n.168.
Note that all broadcasting satellites in use today are positioned in the geo-stationary
orbit approximately 22,300 miles above the earth's equator traveling in a circumference
of 165,000 miles. At this position the rate of the earth's rotation is almost identical to
the rate of the satellite's rotation and thus the footprint of each satellite remains stable. The footprint of each satellite is approximately one-third of the earth's surface.
See Perle, Is the Bird Pie in the Sky?--Communications Satellites and the Law, 27
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y BuLL.325 (1980).
The direct broadcast satellite is capable of providing "spot beam" coverage to a geographic area as small as 200 by 400 miles. Most proposals to provide DBS service,
however, contemplate coverage of a single time zone. The Development of Video Technology, supra note 4, at 810. See also note 64, infra.
7. See The Development of Video Technology, supra note 4, at 806-807. The authors determine that "DBS's resulting cost-effectiveness could make it a viable competitor of the present television networks and pay programming systems."
8. Inquiry Into the Development of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct Broadcast Satellites for the Period Following the 1983 Regional Administrative Radio Conference, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,719 (1980).
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allow an opportunity for diversity of voices in order to further
the goals of the First Amendment, and9 (3) satisfaction of consumers' preferences for programming.

Permanent regulations for DBS cannot be drafted until permanent orbital and frequency allocations are established at
the Western Hemisphere Regional Administrative Radio Conference in 1983 [hereinafter referred to as RARC-83] .1o RARC83 will allot frequencies and orbital slots among the Region 2
nations (the nations of North, Central and South America)"

and may impose certain technical parameters to prevent interference among satellite broadcasts. 2
It is within this context that the FCC has issued interim regulatory policies for DBS and has begun authorizing the development of DBS systems. 3 As a preliminary ftep in the
rulemaking procedure the FCC has determined that DBS is in
the overall public interest and that the public interest will best
be served by as rapid a deployment of DBS as possible. 4 The
rulemaking indicates that the FCC wishes to foster free compe9. Id. at 72,719.
10. See generally Rice, Regulation of Direct Broadcast Satellites: International
Constraintsand Domestic Options, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L REv.813 (1980).
11. "The practice of the ITU (International Telecommunications Union) is to allocate radio frequencies on a "regional" basis. For this purpose, the globe is divided into
three principal Regions.... Region 2 being North, Central and South America....
Although allocations are approved by the full ITU membership participating in an appropriate Radio Conference, each Region has a substantial influence over its own allocations." Stowe, Implicationsof the 1979 WARCfor i2 GHz Satellite Services in Region
2, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-THIRD COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE

93

(1979).
12. The main role of the ITU in this area, for purposes of this note, is to prevent
interference among satellite transmissions. The ITU is also involved with international issues that involve the application of technical parameters. These include the
right of nations to protection from unwanted DBS transmissions, where the trend is
decidedly toward prior consent, and the issue of whether spectrum space should be
allocated on an a priori rather than a first-come-first-served basis, where the trend is
toward a priori allocation. See Rice, Regulation of Direct BroadcastSatellites: International Constraints and Domestic Options, supra note 10, at 813-821. This note is an
examination of the domestic policy issues surrounding DBS and as such will not address these international issues.
13. Development of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct Broadcast Satellites for
the Period Following the 1983 Regional Administrative Radio Conference, 47 Fed. Reg.
31,555 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Interim Order].
Inquiry Into the Development of Regulatory Policy in regard to Direct Broadcast
Satellites for the period following the 1983 Regional Administrative Radio Conference,
86 F.C.C.2d 719 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Interim Notice] (also printed as Inquiry
into the Development of Regulatory Police in Regard to Interim Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, 46 Fed. Reg. 30,124 (1981)).
14. Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,558.
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tition and experimentation in this new telecommunications
technology. To that end the FCC has shown a willingness to
authorize5 essentially uninhibited development of DBS
systems.1
This note provides an explanation and analysis of the FCC's
domestic interim policy decisions relating to the implementation of DBS. The note will examine the Commission's authority to act, the nature of its public interest determinations, the
Commission's analysis of the impact of DBS on local broadcasters and the resultant regulatory scheme for DBS.

II
FCC's Authority to Promulgate Interim Policies
The FCC has a broad statutory responsibility to "study new
uses for radio, provide for experimental uses of frequencies
and generally encourage the larger and more effective uses of
radio in the public interest .... ,,16 The Commission has broad
discretion in carrying out the statutory responsibilities granted
it by Congress. This grant of broad regulatory discretion reflects a recognition by Congress of the complexity of the communications industry. 7 The FCC has general rulemaking
authority under sections 154(i)1 8 and 303 (r)' 9 of the Communications Act of 193420 to regulate in a manner "not inconsistent
with the Act or law."' 2 1 These sections provide statutory authority for the FCC to issue regulations setting forth its interpretation of what constitutes "the public interest."
The FCC has primary authority to decide whether to act
through rulemaking or through individual, ad hoc proceedings.
The choice lies primarily "in the informed discretion of the ad15. See notes 37 to 45 and accompanying text, infra.
16. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1976).
17. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting, 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956): "The growing
complexity of our economy induced the Congress to place regulation of businesses like
communication in specialized agencies with broad powers. Courts are slow to inter"
fere with their conclusions ...
18. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1976) provides that "The Commission may perform any and
all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with
this [Act] as may be necessary in the execution of its functions."
19. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976) provides that the Commission shall "make such rules
and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with
law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this [Act] ."
20. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976) (as amended).
21. United States v. Storer Broadcasting, 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956).
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ministrative agency."" An administrative agency may wish to
act through ad hoc proceedings when it is confronted by a situation involving unforeseeable problems, when a general rule
would have only marginal utility due to the varying nature of
the problem or when the agency lacks "sufficient experience
with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative
judgment into a hard and fast rule. 23
Within this context of broad regulatory discretion,
the FCC
promulgated interim policies for direct broadcast satellites.
Using its broad statutory authority, the FCC adopted what may
be considered a hybrid form of interim regulation, choosing to
decide certain threshold policy issues by rulemaking and to
leave others subject to ad hoc adjudication and the exigencies
of the open market.24 On the one hand, this approach reflects a
realization by the Commission that interim development will
substantially determine long-term DBS policy, given the substantial lead times 25 and enormous investments 26 involved, and
that, therefore, certain basic issues should be decided at the
outset. The Commission noted that a rulemaking procedure
provides an opportunity for interested parties to express their
views, which is especially important in a situation where, as
here, authorization of development will have major permanent
policy implications.27 On the other hand, this approach reflects
a belief by the Commission that delaying implementation of
the new technology in a drawn-out rulemaking procedure
clearly would not be in the public interest.28 Underlying this

aspect of the FCC's judgment is a belief that, at least initially,
22. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1946).
23. Id. at 202.
24. See notes 110-114 and accompanying text, infra.
25. It is estimated that a lead time of at least three years is required to construct a
direct broadcast satellite. See Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 741. See also F. SETZER, B.
FRANCA & N. CORNELL, FCC POLICIES FOR REGULATION OF DIRECT BROADCAST SATEL-

LITES (1980) [hereinafter cited as OPP STAFF REPORT ON DBS] (a staff report by the

FCC's Office of Plans and Policy). The expected lifetime of a satellite is seven to ten
years. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 742.
26. The estimated cost of constructing a direct broadcast satellite is $250 million.
OPP STAFF REPORT ON DBS, supra note 25, at 9 n.20 (information based on discussions
with Comsat representatives).
See also Direct Broadcastingto Home Satellites - Boon or Bane to Broadcasting,
Cable and the Public: A Panel Discussion, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 121, 133-134 (1982) (transcript of proceedings held at the A.B.A. annual meeting in New Orleans on Aug. 7,
1981), estimating the cost of a DBS system at from $00 million to $750 million.
27. Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,556. See also Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at
726.
28. See Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,558-31,559.
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many aspects of the new and untried DBS technology should
be worked out in the open market and that the FCC should not
act on certain regulatory issues until it has developed a substantial base of empirical data upon which informed regulatory
decisions can be based.29
The FCC's decision to make only limited use of its rulemaking power with regard to entry policies for DBS was largely influenced by a similar system adopted by the Commission a
decade ago for market entry of domestic communications
satellites, commonly referred to as the "multiple entry policy."
The multiple entry policy provided for a limited regulatory
structure allowing any qualified entity to launch a domestic
communications satellite system subject to certain technical
and antitrust restrictions. 0 In the interim DBS proceedings
the Commission stated that, when considering DBS applications, "our policy ...

will be to maintain a flexible and open

approach that is patterned after the open entry policy we have
used for the domestic satellite service."'" The Commission colloquially2 refers to its policy for DBS as the "open skies
3'
policy.

III
Public Interest Determinations
A. Basic Findings
In the DBS proceedings, the FCC determined that both permanent and interim authorization of DBS is in the overall public interest. Given the long-lasting implications of early DBS
development 33 the Commission felt that a basic finding of "the
public interest" in the permanent establishment of nationwide
29. Id. at 31,568.
30. Thus, while the FCC refused to select a certain type of market structure as the
optimal configuration for domestic communications satellites it did restrict the permissible scope of involvement of certain large carriers, particularly AT&T, and required
domestic satellite companies to provide a variety of services. This policy reflects an
effort by the FCC to balance competition and regulation. Second Report and Order In
the Matter of Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by NonGovernmental Entities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844 (1972).
31. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 728. See also Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at
31,568, stating that "during this interim period, we will ... process applications and
grant authorizations under a scheme patterned after Part 5 of the Commission's Rules
and the 'open entry' policy successfully used in the domestic satellite field."
32. Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,564.
33. See notes 46-50 and accompanying text, infra.
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DBS systems was necessary in the interim authorization stage.
In addition, the FCC determined that there are several separate public interest factors involved in the interim authorization of DBS. In making a preliminary assessment of the public
interest factors inherent in this new technology the FCC proceeded in accordance with parts 534 and 7435 of its rules which
require the FCC to determine that the public interest convenience and necessity support development of new communications technology.
In determining the public's interest in the permanent establishment of DBS, the Commission noted the following benefits
of DBS: (1) the unique capacity of DBS to provide telecommunications services, especially to rural and remote areas; (2) the
additional channel capacity and consequent greater diversity
that DBS will provide; (3) the expansion of the program production industry that will result from additional program demand generated by DBS; (4) the greater programming
specialization that will be provided by DBS systems operating
in subscription mode; (5) the potential of DBS to provide educational programming and the dissemination of medical information; (6) the potential of DBS to operate as a vehicle for new
video services such as high definition television. 6
B. Policy of Expeditious Development
Pursuant to the determination that DBS is in the public interest, the Commission decided to proceed expeditiously in
processing interim applications to provide DBS service.3 7
34. 47 C.F.R. § 5.253(e) provides that "frequencies will not be assigned for the development of a service for which no frequencies have been allocated until the Commission has made a preliminary determination that the public interest, convenience or
necessity would be served by the establishment of the service."
35. 47 C.F.R. § 74.103(d) provides that an "experimental operation which looks toward the development of radio transmitting apparatus or the rendition of any type of
regular service using such frequencies will not be authorized prior to a determination
by the Commission that the development of such apparatus ... would serve the public interest."
36. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 728-729. See also Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at
31,558.
37. See Eight Direct Broadcast Satellite Applications Accepted for Interim
Processing: Six Rejected as Incomplete and Eliminated from First-Priority Consideration, 46 Fed. Reg. 54,796 (1981). The Commission accepted the applications of CBS,
Inc., Direct Broadcast Satellite Corporation, RCA American Communications, Inc.,
Graphic Scanning Corporation, United States Satellite Broadcasting Company, Video
Satellite Systems, Inc., and Western Union Telegraph Company for further consideration. These applications will be considered along with the application of Satellite Tele-
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Three factors were central to this aspect of the FCC's determination. First is the FCC's sporadic policy of encouraging the
earliest possible development of new communications technologies. The Commission stated that:
vision Corporation which was accepted April 21, 1981 at the Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d
at 719. The Commission rejected the applications of Advance, Inc., Home Broadcast
TV Partners, National Christian Network, Inc., Satellite Development Trust and Unitel
Corporation as being substantially incomplete. The rejected applicants will not be precluded from amending their applications but will be given lower priority in comparative proceedings, if they become necessary, after frequencies and orbital slots
available to the United States are determined at RARC-83. In addition, the application
of Focus Broadcast Satellite Company was accepted in part and rejected in part. The
Commission accepted for further consideration the proposal of Focus to provide services via Western Union's Advanced Westar Satellite and rejected the proposal of Focus
to build and operate its own satellite system.
The Commission's views with regard to these applications are more fully set forth in
Application of Advance, Inc., 88 F.C.C.2d 100 (1981) (pages renumbered). In adhering
to a rigid cutoff date forfiling acceptable DBS applications, the Commission stated:
Our adherence to principles that preserve the integrity of this cutoff procedure
serves the policy stated in this docket of promoting the expeditious processing
of DBS applications in order to encourage the rapid introduction of new services. Because of the exceptionally long lead time required for satellite construction, we continue to believe that prompt consideration and authorization
of experimental DBS proposals is an important adjunct to our goal of achieving early inauguration of the service .... By providing an incentive for applicants to formulate and submit their proposals expeditiously, the cutoff
mechanism supports and enhances this policy aim.
Id. at 108.
The dissenting opinion of Commissioner Anne P. Jones, however, forcefully argues
that the Commission is acting too hastily with regard to the interim authorization of
DBS, stating that "we are rushing to judgment based upon too little information and
deliberation." Id. at 117. Commissioner Jones raises the question:
Why are we being so exclusionary so early in the process? , ,
The answer, of course, is that it is not early in the process and that the whole
concept of an "interim" DBS system is an illusion. There is very little that is
interim in what we are doing here.
The Commission will very soon be able to authorize the construction of
these "interim" systems. Indeed, authorization may come before the 1983 Regional Administrative Radio Conference (RARC), which is to address the allocation of spectrum and orbital slots from DBS in the Western Hemisphere.
Unless we intend to be hemispheric hogs of spectrum and orbit, why do we
wish to present the RARC with a fait accompli?
Id. at 116.
The separate statement of Commissioner Mimi Weyforth Dawson expresses concern
that strict adherence to the cutoff date will limit the future of DBS. Id. at 119. Commissioner Dawson states that "DBS is a new service and I do not believe we should
exclude potential parties or services at this early date. I believe we should remain as
expansive as possible for as long as possible." Id.
See also Application of Advance, Inc., 89 F.C.C.2d 177 (1982), wherein the Commission denied petitions for reconsideration of its ruling that certain direct broadcast satellite applications were incomplete and unacceptable for filing.
An appeal of these decisions is pending. National Christian Network, Inc. v. FCC,
No. 82-1345, (D.C. Cir. appeal filed March 31, 1982).
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an important aspect of our statutory mandate to "encourage
the larger and more effective use of radio" is to ensure that the
benefits of new communications services are made available to
the American people in the most timely manner possible.3 8
The implementation of DBS service would be impeded by
waiting for permanent policy determinations to be made after
RARC-83, especially given construction or lead times of three
years or more.3 9 Second is the FCC's determination that experimental DBS systems will provide valuable technical and
marketing experience. 4° For instance, the demand for DBS
services will indicate the amount of spectrum space the systems will require as well as the type and extent of regulatory
structure needed to preserve a competitive market. 4 1 Third is
the FCC's purely pragmatic determination that the congruence
of substantial satellite construction times and relatively short
satellite equipment lives will allow major policy modifications
with relative ease.Y The substantial construction times involved in the development of DBS systems (at least three
years) mean that no DBS system will be ready for launch until
permanent policies are promulgated subsequent to RARC-83.
Any essential modifications needed to bring the developmental
systems into line with permanent policies can therefore be
made prior to launch. The brevity of anticipated satellite
equipment lives (seven to ten years) is deemed by the FCC to
be advantageous in that "policies adopted for a first generation
of satellites can be modified for later generations without
greatly affecting the interests of the owner of the initial system. ' 43 In passing, the Commission noted that some policy
modifications could require equipment changes and the imposition of severe costs on either the operator of the DBS system
or on the public. The interim rulemaking for DBS raised the
possibility, for instance, that "some changes in technical parameters would make transmissions from later satellites incompatible with receiving equipment owned by the public."'
38. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 741.
39. See note 25, supra.
40. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 742.
41. See text accompanying notes 110-120, infra.
42. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 742. While the FCC may be theoretically correct,
in practice it will be nearly impossible for the FCC to modify its policies regarding the
types of services provided and by whom. See notes 46-50 and accompanying text,
infra.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 742 n.50.
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However, the Commission has indicated a willingness to discount these potential problems in light of what it regards to be
the more important determination that the 45earliest possible
deployment of DBS is in the public interest.
C. De Facto Standards
The notion that equipment or policy modifications may easily be made, however, is largely unrealistic. The Commission
recognized this fact at various points in the DBS proceedings.
For example, the license conditions adopted for DBS provide
that while DBS systems will be subject to any policies and
rules the Commission may later adopt, "in most circumstances
the regulatory policies in force at the time of authorization to
construct a satellite shall remain in force for that satellite
throughout its operating lifetime. 46
Indeed, it is quite unlikely that major technical modifications
will be imposed on initial DBS operators. Initial DBS companies, each with several hundred million dollars invested in a
particular technical and equipment configuration, will essentially set de facto operating standards for the industry. For this
reason, the interim proceedings for DBS have every characteristic of permanent policy making. 7 The Commission recognized that the large number of authorizations to provide DBS
service in the near future, with the consequent enormous investment involved, "is likely to have a major and permanent
effect on the use of the band ....

,48 The Commission is con-

vinced, however, that the DBS technology will evolve quickly
and will be responsive to consumer demand. 9 In light of the
FCC's determination that DBS entrepreneurs will have strong
incentive to make "correct" technical judgments, the Commission stated that:
If an initial DBS system sets de facto technical standards for
45. See notes 37-42 and accompanying text, supra.
46. 47 Fed. Reg. 31575 (1982) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 100.19).
47. See Concurring Statement of FCC Commissioner James H. Quello, Interim Or-

der, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,577, Commissioner Quello argued that:
While this Report and order has been characterized as an "interim" action, it
clearly authorizes a new service which has the potential to dramatically
change the current pattern of video distribution in this country. Given the
huge capital resources required to participate in this "interim" venture, it is
unlikely that the Commission will embark upon a different course once the
resources have been committed and the service has begun.
48. Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,556.
49. Id. at 31,571.
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the service, we have no reason to believe that those standards
any standards the
would necessarily be less appropriate than
50
Commission might impose at this time.
Clearly, the FCC is placing an enormous policy burden on
the market economy in a sphere where, because of the high
level of investments involved, technological determinations
will be difficult to reverse. This reaction to DBS, the cutting
edge of new communications technology, indicates a changing
attitude at the FCC about the proper way to safeguard the public good in the communications field.
D.

Existing Users of the Spectrum

The FCC also balanced the public interest factors favoring
early DBS development with the interests of the existing
users5 1 of the frequency spectrum band which is being set
aside for DBS broadcast operations (the 12.2 to 12.7 GHz
band). The Commission determined that the interests of the
current users of the band do not override the interests involved
in the introduction of DBS. 52 This position reflects a Commission judgment that the potential benefits of DBS are great and
that some adjustment by other telecommunications services to
accomodate DBS is therefore justified.5 3
The Commission stated that:
[W] e believe that the concerns of the present operational-fixed
microwave users deserve serious attention. We do not believe,
however, that our concern for these terrestrial users should
preclude the introduction of DBS service. We believe that the
potential benefits of DBS justify some adjustments in other
services. Furthermore, we believe that interim rules and policies can be established that permit DBS operation with minimal impact on existing 12 GHz terrestrial users.5 4
50. Id. See also Chamberlin, Lessons in Regulating Information Flow: The FCC's

Weak Track Record in Interpreting the Public Interest Standard, 60 N.C.L. REV. 1057
(1982).
51. The Commission estimates that about 1900 radio links are currently licensed in
the 12 GHz band. A radio link is defined as a one-way transmission on a single discrete
frequency between a transmitter and a receiver. "These systems provide private, industrial, transportation, and safety (PITS) services and are used, for example, by local
governments, banks, newspapers, railroads, utility companies, universities, and colleges." Id. at 31,564.
52. Id. See also Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 730.
53. Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,564. See also Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at
732.
54. Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,564.
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It will not be known precisely which frequencies will be allocated to DBS systems providing transmissions to the United
States until RARC-83. Thus, it is impossible to determine precisely which current operations in the 12.2 and 12.7 GHz band
may interfere with DBS operations. Nevertheless, the FCC
has put all existing users on notice. The Commission stated
that "the terrestrial users will be subject to reassignment
within the 12 GHz band or other appropriate bands if they
cause interference to a DBS system and cannot adjust their
technical parameters to eliminate the interference.""5
As intimated in the Notice," the Commission will allow current licensees to remain in the band for a specific period of
time without, being required to protect DBS systems from interference. The Commission will allow current terrestrial
users to remain on current terms for five years from the issuance of a final Report and Order allocating alternative frequency bands for terrestrial use.5 7 Subsequent to the
expiration of that period, terrestrial users will be required to
make all adjustments necessary to prevent interference with
DBS systems. 58 Terrestrial operators entering the band subsequent to the final Report and Order will be required to avoid
interference with DBS systems. 9
This scheme is designed to reduce the costs of terrestrial relocation, permitting current terrestrial users to move to new
frequencies in the normal course of equipment replacement.
Under the scheme, a DBS operator confronted by interference
prior to expiration of the five year grace period could (1) compensate the terrestrial operator for its move, (2) develop receiving equipment that could provide acceptable service
despite interference, or (3) simply not operate until the terres55. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 732.
56. Id. at 733.
57. The DBS regulations provide that:
Operational-fixed stations authorized in this band prior to the issuance of a
Report and Order allocating alternative frequency bands for the operationalfixed service shall not be required to protect domestic broadcasting-satellite
systems from interference for a period of five years from the date of issuance
of that Report and Order.
47 Fed. Reg. 31574 (1982) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 94.65(h)). The Commission expects that the final Report and Order will be acted upon within six weeks of the com-

pletion of the RARC-83 which begins June 13, 1983 and is expected to last five weeks.
The five-year grace period is thus expected to begin September 4, 1983. Interim Order,
47 Fed. Reg. at 31,566.
58. 47 Fed. Reg. 31574 (1982) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 94.65(h)).
59. Id.
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trial user relocates. 60 The Commission believes that DBS operators will have strong incentive to compensate current users
for the costs of moving to other frequency bands should interference problems develop during the five year period because
it assumes that DBS systems represent a more valuable and
thus more profitable use of the band.61
However, if DBS operators do not compensate terrestrial
users for the costs of relocating, terrestrial operators will eventually be straddled with costs of over $88,000 each in effecting a
move to reassigned frequencies.62 In addition, it is estimated
that terrestrial operators currently have $270 million invested
in equipment that is useful only in the 12 GHz band.63 In light
of the certain hardships that will be imposed upon most, if not
all, terrestrial users one may well question the Commission's
public interest determinations.

IV
Impact on Local Broadcasters
A. Localism Policy
The encouragement of local broadcasting has been a fundamental goal of the FCC's television regulation. The potential
disruption of local broadcasting services by DBS is a major issue with which the FCC has had to deal in the DBS
proceedings.
DBS is by nature national or semi-national in scope since it
is capable of serving broad geographic areas. As a result, DBS
is predisposed to operate on a level which will not emphasize
the needs of local communities. DBS transmissions can be
designed to cover relatively small geographic areas,64 but to require this approach would seem to ignore a basic advantage of
the technology; its ability to provide broad-based services.
Most interim DBS proposals, for instance, contemplate cover60. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 733-734.
61. Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,566 n.60.
62. Id. at 31,565 n.56.
63. Id.
64. See The Development of Video Technology, supra note 4, at 810 n.168: "Although a communications satellite is capable of 'seeing' as much as one-third of the
earth's surface, the transmitting antennas located on the satellites can be designed to
'illuminate' discrete positions of the earth." For purposes of program coordination it
may well be most desirable to confine DBS transmissions to a single time zone.
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age by time zone. 6' DBS systems will bypass conventional television transmitters and cable television networks and will
essentially have no terrestrial base. In fact, a special staff report prepared for the FCC determined that the provision of
network programming by DBS would constitute "networking
without affiliates"66 in that DBS systems will completely bypass local distribution facilities.
Section 307(b) of the Communications Act 67 has traditionally

been construed to embody the concept of localism in the Commission's distribution of licenses, frequencies, hours of operation and power.68 Traditionally the FCC has carried out the
mandate of this section "by insuring that viewers would be
provided service via a system of locally-assigned channels as
opposed to regional or even national channels."6 9 This has
been the result of the FCC's interpretation of the language of
section 307(b) as requiring an equitable distribution of television stations among the several states and communities rather
than as requiring an equitable distribution of television service
among the several states and communities. This policy was reflected in the Commission's 1952 television station assignment
plan70 under which one to nine commercial television channels
were assigned to each of 1260 geographical 'markets' in the
country.7 '
65. See note 64, supra.
66. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FINAL REPORT, NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS: ENTRY, JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGU-

LATION 1-103 (1980) [hereinafter cited as NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF REPORT].
67. 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1976) provides:
In considering applications for licenses, and modifications and renewals
thereof, when and insofar as there is demand for the same, the Commission
shall make such distribution of licenses, frequencies, hours of operation, and
of power among the several States and communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to each of the same.
68. See Federal Communications Commission v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp.,
349 U.S. 358, 362 (1955). "Fairness to communities is furthered by a recognition of local
needs for a community radio mouthpiece." Id. See ailso Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v.
Federal Communications Commission, 230 F.2d 204, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 1007. "In requiring a fair and equitable distribution of service Section 307(b)
encompasses not only the reception of an adequate signal but also community needs
for programs of local interest and importance and for organs of local self expression."
230 F.2d at 207.
69. NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 66, at 1-52.
70. Sixth Report and Order, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952).
71. NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 66, at I-5.
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B. Section 307(b) Applied To DBS
In its interim rulemaking for DBS and FCC declined to interpret section 307(b) as requiring that it authorize only locallybased communications services. The Commission took the
position that the statutory scheme merely requires that it
make an equitable distribution of television service and that
the means to accomplish that goal are within the Commission's
discretion. Thus, the FCC has taken che position that, while
the concept of localism is often an excellent means of achieving the goal of equitable distribution, section 307(b) "does not
foreclose other, or additional, means of fairly, efficiently, and
equitably distributing
radio service among the several states
73
and communities.
A significant part of the Commission's concern is that it must
be responsive to the need for incorporation of new communications technologies reflecting the view that it would be unreasonable to halt or even restrict the development of a beneficial
new telecommunications technology based on an unduly parochial construction of the Communications Act. In fact, the
Commission has indicated that its mandate to encourage the
development of new telecommunications systems under section 303(g) of the Act 74 would be violated by such an approach. In the context of DBS development the Commission
appropriately chose to rely on its broad powers under the
Communications Act to attain the statutory goal of a rapid, efficient, nationwide wire and radio communications service. In
this regard the FCC, in its interim rulemaking for DBS, relied
on FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,76

which held that the Commission has authority to construct "a
reasonable administrative response to changed circumstances
in the broadcasting industry. 7 7 The case also held that the
FCC may give "controlling weight in some circumstances to its
more general goal of achieving 'the best practicable service to
the public.' "78
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31, 559. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 736.
Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 737.
47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1976).
Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 737.
436 U.S. 775 (1978).
Id. at 797.
Id. at 810.
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C. Effectiveness of Localism Policy
An- unswerving reliance on the concept of localism would
seem unreasonable given that in any event network programming of national scope already dominates the television distribution system. The FCC's encouragement of locally-based
television stations reflects the laudable goal of fostering a
broadcasting system which is responsive to local interests.
The extent to which the national network distribution system
already detracts from this goal cannot be overlooked, however,
in any analysis of a new telecommunications service which,
like DBS, does not have a local base.
In analyzing the potential impact of DBS on local broadcasting it is important to realistically gauge the present impact of
local broadcasting. Nationally-distributed programming is the
dominant force in the dissemination of television programming. Most local broadcasters are economically disadvantaged
in developing or providing truly localized broadcasting. One
reason may be that the broadcasting industry particularly
lends itself to national systems of distribution. The FCC's Network Inquiry Special Staff recognized this in stating:
[T]he underlying economics of television assure the dominance of nationwide distribution methods. Once a program is
produced for viewers in one city, showing it elsewhere involves
only the additional costs of distribution. It is unthinkable that
television could be a largely localized industry any more than
could book or magazine publishing.7 9

The system of local television distribution is designed to foster a multitude of viewpoints in broadcasting as each local station selects programming which is appropriate for viewers in
its area. This promotes the dispersal of political and cultural
control to localized entities. However, the meaning of the concept of localism has never been precisely defined and the exact
goals of the FCC's policy of localism are obscure. In some
cases the term "localism" has been identified with a notion
that individual choice should govern the nature and content of
programming in the community. By contrast, the term "localism" has at other times been used to designate "a policy that
values the identity of a community rather than the notion of
individual choice." 80
79. NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 66, at 1-139.
80. Id. at 1-471.
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Given the uncertainties underlying the policy favoring localism and the practical ineffectiveness of that policy, a departure
from the concept of localism in instituting a new telecommunications technology does less damage to citizen control over the
broadcasting system than might initially be expected. This is
not to say that the concept of localism has no role to play in
encouraging concern for local environments and local issues in
the conventional television distribution industry. However, it
is doubtful that the policy of localism ought to constrain the
development of new communications technologies that, like
DBS,are national in nature.
D. FCC Determination of Impact on Local Broadcasters
The FCC, in the DBS rulemaking, discounted the impact of
DBS on local broadcasters by determining that the likely scale
of penetration by DBS into local broadcasting markets would
be negligible and, at the very least, far outweighed by the beneficial aspect of DBS.1 In this regard the Commission apparently adopted the views of a staff report by its Office of Plans
and Policy 82 that determined that DBS will operate in a highly

competitive market with other new communications technologies8 3 offering services similar to those provided by DBS. In
addition, the report estimated that equipment costs for DBS
will be relatively high and that DBS operators will be forced by
marketplace considerations to offer services that are considered superior to those provided by conventional broadcasters.8 4 The report predicted that "In the beginning ... since the
equipment will be expensive and owned by few households,
DBS will have to attract an audience by offering premium programming that is considered superior to that provided by advertiser-supported over-the-air broadcasters. 85 In the context
of these projected marketplace and technical difficulties the
FCC determined that the impact of DBS on locally-based sys86
tems of program distribution will probably not be substantial.
The Commission relied solely on three reports to show empirically that the expected scale of market penetration by DBS
81. Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,561. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 741.
82. OPP STAFF REPORT ON DBS, supra note 25.

83. The new technologies enumerated by the staff are cable, subscription television (STV), multi-point distribution service (MDS), video cassettes and video discs.
84. OPP STAFF REPORT ON DBS, supra note 25, at 10.
85. Id.

86. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 741.
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will be negligible.8" This aspect of the Commission's DBS
rulemaking shows, more than anything else, the FCC's general
lack of concern with the impact of DBS on local broadcasters.
The first of the studies88 was an econometric analysis by the
National Cable Television Association of the penetration into
local broadcast markets of cable systems engaged only in retransmission of over-the-air signals.89 The study found that the
impact of this form of cable television was negligible, causing
less than a ten percent decline in local audiences.9 ° Most importantly, this report, in analyzing cable systems that only retransmit the signals of conventional broadcasters, did not
attempt to measure the impact on local broadcasters of a new
telecommunications system, such as DBS, that will provide a
different line of programming as well as a different form of program delivery. Further, there is some indication that cable systems that merely retransmit over-the-air signals may actually
increase the audiences of local stations by improving their reception quality within the local communities themselves. 1
The second study9 2 was a non-quantitative assessment, conducted for the National Association of Broadcasters, of the projected impact of pay-DBS systems on local advertisersupported broadcasters. The report concluded that pay-DBS
systems will penetrate local broadcasting markets only to a
negligible extent. 3 Thus, the major competitive impact of DBS
systems was estimated to be upon other new technologies providing pay communications services. 4 It is not at all clear,
however, that DBS will be confined to a pay service mode, and
in fact several of those filing applications to provide DBS services under the FCC's rulemaking procedure have proposed advertiser-supported systems. 5 Accordingly, to the extent that
87. Id. at 737-741.
88. National Cable Television Association, Inquiry into the Economic Relationship
Between Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, cited in Interim Notice, 86
F.C.C.2d at 738.
89. A cable system which retransmits over-the-air signals merely rebroadcasts the
programming of a conventional local station over its system to a larger region.
90. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 739.
91. Id.
92. Ayvasian, Blake & Cantor, Direct Broadcast Satellites: Preliminary Assessment of Prospects and Policy Issues, Kalba Bowen Associates, cited in Interim Notice,
86 F.C.C.2d at 738.
93. Id.

94. Id.
95. Conversation with Florence Setzer, FCC Office of Plans and Policy (December
2, 1981).
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this study analyzed DBS' projected impact only in terms of the
pay television broadcasting market, it failed to fully appreciate
the potential impact of DBS. As there is every indication that
DBS will operate in both pay-supported and advertiser-supported modes of service, DBS has a far broader potential impact upon local and national advertiser-supported broadcast
systems than was indicated by this study.
The third study9 6 conducted for Satellite Television Corporation, used an econometric analysis to project the impact of the
audience diversion from local broadcasting to pay-DBS. The
study focused on the relative attractiveness of pay-DBS and
competing pay services, concluding that DBS will have a negligible impact on local broadcasting.97 Apart from the assumption that DBS systems will operate solely in a pay-service
mode-an unrealistic view taken in the third as well as second
study-the data utilized in the third study may itself be unreliable. The Commission has stated that estimates from the
study "must be used with caution, in part because of the possibility of large statistical errors." 9s Furthermore, the study's assumption that DBS systems will provide only three channels of
programming9 9 may prove to be highly unrealistic. 10 0
The point here is not to dwell on the possible inaccuracies of
the data used by the Commission but rather to indicate the
lack of serious thought accorded to the issue of the impact of
DBS on local broadcasters. The FCC is, rightly or wrongly, unwilling to excessively delay the implementation of technologi96. Satellite Television Corporation, Pay Television Services via Direct Broadcast
Satellites: Demand and Impact in the 1980's, Arthur D. Little, Inc., cited in Interim
Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 740.
97. Given viewers' preferences in 1979, a three-channel DBS system priced at
$20 a month in competition with pay cable was estimated to attract from 1 to 8
percent of television households, depending on how different the programming and other characteristics of DBS were perceived to be from those of
other pay services. With no pay video competition, penetration would range
between 12 and 16 percent. At $24 per month, DBS penetration was estimated
at between 0 and 6 percent in competition with pay cable and between 9 and 12
percent with no competition. We should note that STC (Satellite Television
Corporation, an applicant for interim DBS development) plans to charge between $14 and $18 per month for programming and an additional $6 to $10 per
month for leased equipment.

Id.
98. Id.
99. See note 97, supra.
100. Conversation with Florence Setzer, FCC Office of Plans and Policy (December
2, 1981).
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cal changes in the communications industry. 0 1 In addition,
there is no statutory requirement that the Commission rigidly
adhere to the concept of localism"0 2 and it seems clear that it
has been unwise in the past for the Commission to constrain
the development of new communications technologies. 0 3 The
primary effect of such constraints in the past may merely have
been the protection of existing licensees from competition.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the FCC appears willing
to proceed in an atmosphere of relative uncertainty as to the
ultimate market impact of DBS. This is perhaps the most real-

istic policy to adopt and may be the best means by which to
gain practical knowledge about the market characteristics of

the new technology. It certainly reflects a move away from the
imposition of regulations' ° and constraints upon emerging unfamiliar technologies. There may also be a strong element of
technological determinism in this attitude wherein the Commission sees its most important function as avoiding interference with the inevitable array of marketplace and
technological changes in communications.
E.

Focus on Overall Impact

The FCC will consider economic harm to individual broadcasters only as it relates to the overall impact on consumers.
The Commission is concerned only with the ultimate effect on
not with the profitability of specific
service to consumers,
05
broadcasters.
101. It may be that the Commission is reacting mainly to prevailing political realities in this regard. It is clear that the Commission's stance on the development of
DBS, as expressed in its interim rulemaking, is in accord with the views of the Reagan
Administration. Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge has expressed the Administration's support for as rapid a development on DBS as possible, and an official of
Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration stated, after the Commission released its interim notice for DBS, that "the FCC did what we
want it to do .... We didn't want to stand in the way of new technology." BROADCASTING, April 27, 1981, at 30.

102. See text accompanying notes 72-78, supra.
103. Two primary examples of policies that may have adversely affected the
financial viability and competitive prospects of emerging telecommunications services
are restrictions on distant signal carriage by cable television systems and anti-siphoning restrictions on pay programming services. See NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF
REPORT, supra note 66, at 1-105-120. The report argues that regulatory barriers imposing restrictions as to service offerings by cable and subscription television (STV)
stunted the growth of those services and that relaxation of those barriers has substantially contributed to their growth.
104. See text accompanying note 150, infra.
105. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 738.
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The Commission is required to consider the economic effect of
a new service on existing broadcasters only if there is strong
evidence that a significant net reduction in service to the public
will result. The Commission cannot reject a new service solely
because its0 6entry will reduce the revenues or profits of existing
licensees.1
Essentially, the burden of proving the adverse effects of a
new service on the public interest rests with those opposing
the new service, in this case the broadcasters. The FCC determined that there is "no hard evidence that DBS systems will
have a critically adverse effect on existing broadcast service.' 0 7 Thus, the burden of proof was not met by opponents of
DBS. It is important to note, however, that this is a decision
made largely in the dark, by default. As the Commission
stated:
[W]e cannot predict how many DBS systems will actually go
into operation in the foreseeable future, and we have too little
experience with markets having large numbers of video channels to predict viewers' response0 8 to the availability of additional channels in such markets.1
The Commission determined that any adverse impact on local broadcasting will be outweighed by the benefits of DBS. 10 9
This is an uncertain judgment, however, and may fail to take
into account that what is sacrificed in terms of local broadcasting may well be irreplaceable.
106. Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,561.
This is established FCC policy. For an early example see FCC v. Sanders Radio
Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473 (1940), where the Supreme Court held that:
Resulting economic injury to a rival station is not, in and of itself, and apart
from considerations of public convenience, interest, or necessity, an element

the petitioner (FCC) must weigh, and as to which it must make findings, in
passing on an application for a broadcasting license.
Furthermore, the court held that:
Plainly it is not the purpose of the Act to protect a licensee against competition but to protect the public. Congress intended to leave competition in the
business of broadcasting where it found it.
Id. at 475.
107. Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,561.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 31,558.
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V
Interim Regulatory Scheme
A.

Policy of Minimal Regulation

In establishing interim regulatory policies for DBS the FCC
has determined that the most desirable course of action is to
impose as few rules as possible in the experimental stage. 1 0
The Commission determined that an "open and flexible approach" ' will create a developmental environment in which
the business judgments of individual DBS entrepreneurs,
rather than the regulatory structure, will ultimately determine
the characteristics of DBS service. The FCC decided that experimentation and innovation are especially valuable during
the introduction of a new technology such as DBS and that
"the public interest will be best served by a regulatory policy
that is flexible enough to allow for different system approaches
in the interim period."'1 2 By using this approach, the Commission hopes to retain substantial flexibility for drafting future
regulatory policies, if it is later determined that the imposition
of regulatory constraints would be desirable."' This approach
reflects, on the one hand, a faith that marketplace mechanisms
will produce the optimal form of service and, on the other
hand, a belief that DBS entrepreneurs will have more resources and better information than the Commission, as well
as strong financial incentives to develop systems which the
public demands through the marketplace." 4
B.

Mechanics of Interim Regulations
The FCC will impose on developmental DBS systems only
110. Id. See also Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 750.

111. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 750.
112. Id. at 752.
113. Such constraints would be applicable to all developmental DBS systems and
DBS operators will assume the risk that the Commission may impose restrictive rules
and policies. Id. at 752-753.
But see 47 Fed. Reg. 31575 (1982) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 100.19(a)) which
provides:
All authorizations for interim direct broadcast satellite systems shall be subject to the policies set forth in the Report and Order in General Docket 80-603
and with any policies and rules the Commission may adopt at a later date. It is
the intention of the Commission, however, that in most circumstances the regulatory policies in force at the time of authorization to construct a satellite
shall remain in force for that satellite throughout its operating lifetime.
See also text accompanying notes 46-50 supra.
114. Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,570.

No. 41

DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES

the regulations it must under provisions of the Communications Act. 115 Interim DBS applicants will not be required to
conform to any particular regulatory model but rather will be
regulated by the statutory requirements of the conventional
regulatory classification into which they fall. The Commission
stated that "[i]f the proposal falls within any of the conventional regulatory classifications for radio services, i.e., broadcast, common carrier, or private radio, we will impose the
statutory requirements of that service." ' 16 Applicants, therefore, will be able to choose the regulatory scheme under which
they will operate by choosing the particular characteristics of
the service they propose. Important characteristics include
"the proposed method of financing, whether the service would
of7 control the
be offered to the general public, and the degree 11
applicant would exercise over program content."
Thus, the Commission stated that:
[I]f an applicant proposes to provide direct-to-home service
and retains control over the content of the transmissions, then
the service is probably a broadcast service and the broadcast[Ihf a DBS applicant
ing provisions of Title III will apply ....
chooses to operate as a common carrier, it must offer its satellite transmission services indiscriminately to the public pursuWe
ant to tariff, under the provisions of Title II of the Act ....
see no reason, furthermore, why a DBS operator could not
function as broadcaster with respect to118some channels and a
common carrier with respect to others.
In the Commission's view the main benefit of this policy is
that it will allow a practical determination as to which regulatory constraints are necessary or desirable.' 1 9 A policy of flexibility in the developmental stage of DBS will allow the
Commission to make a judgment as to the appropriate regulatory scheme for DBS based on practical experience with the
workings of the new technology and its market acceptance.
While this policy is directly applicable only to the interim developmental stage of DBS and the Commission has explicitly
stated that interim DBS systems may be subject to more stringent regulations and restrictions under the permanent regula115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 31,567. See also Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 750.
Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 750 n.64.
Id.
Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,568-31,569.
Id. at 31,567.
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tory scheme,'120 it may indicate a fundamental change of heart
at the FCC regarding the appropriateness of imposing comprehensive regulatory schemes upon communications systems.
The policy of flexibility adopted by the FCC for interim DBS
systems is consistent both with a trend at the FCC toward deregulation of communications technologies 12 1 and with a regulatory approach, suggested by several commentators, requiring
22
a closer analysis of the goals to be achieved by regulation.
The Commission's interim regulatory strategy for DBS is
roughly in accord with both trends in that it errs, if at all, on
the side of deregulation while attempting to retain flexibility
for determining a permanent regulatory scheme.
The Commission also declined to impose any restrictions on
multiple ownership and control, reasoning that such constraints are unnecessary either to prevent DBS operators from
obtaining excessive market power or to assure diversity of programming. 123 Furthermore, the Commission refused to impose
access requirements 24 or rules to assure responsiveness of
DBS operations to audience needs, 2 5 reasoning that DBS operators will have sufficient economic incentive to respond adequately to viewers. It is highly doubtful that these policies
adequately take the public interest into account. Marketplace
forces do not produce sufficient access or representation for
those who lack economic and political power. A marketplace
solution leaves underrepresented groups out of the equation.
120. "All experimental authorizations, however, will be subject to any further rules

or policies that may be promulgated in subsequent rulemaking proceedings to devise
permanent policies for this service." Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 752.
121. See, e.g., Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457 (1979). The trend is to rely on
the interaction of economic forces in the pursuit of goals such as programming diversity.
See also Note, Letting the Marketplace Select Radio EntertainmentFormats,27 Loy.
L. REV. 1250 (1981).
122. See O'Riordan, An Examinationof the Application of Common CarrierRegulation to EntitiesProviding New Telecommunications Services, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REy.

577, 580 (1979). "[O]nce the FCC determines under any rationale that a new entity is a
common carrier, regulation automatically ensues, even if there is no need for it. More
appropriately, the FCC's evaluation should encompass an economic analysis of the
new entity's activities. Once the FCC determines that a particular communications
service is not vulnerable to monopolistic practices, regulation need not ensue, even if

the entity is a common carrier 'in the ordinary sense of the term.'" See also Note, The
National Public Radio Satellite System: FCC Jurisdiction Over a New Communica-

tions Technology, 8 J. COMPUTERS TECH. & L. 135 (1980).
123. Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,570.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 31,571.

No. 41

DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES

It would be far preferable to institute access requirements at
the onset of DBS while the technology is still in a formative
stage of development. The Commission should take this opportunity to develop policies which represent the interests of
the entire public. The Commission did, however, impose equal
employment opportunity requirements on interim DBS operators 1 26 reasoning that "[eJmployment decisions made at an

early stage in the organization of DBS systems may have a
lasting impact on the representativeness of the workforce of
DBS operators....

27

Despite its basic hands-off regulatory approach, the Commission has retained authority to allocate orbital and frequency
positions for interim DBS systems. This is the only area in
which the FCC has assumed direct control over developmental
DBS systems. Under section 303 of the Communications Act of
1934128 the FCC has the responsibility to allocate "frequency
bands of the electromagnetic spectrum among various uses
and [to assign] rights to the use of specific frequencies to particular users ....,129 The Commission determined that, as orbital and frequency positions are a scarce resource and an
explicit market price for their utilization does not exist, "market forces will not lead to standards for orbit and spectrum utilization that properly
take into account the scarcity of orbit and
13
'
spectrum space.

0

The task of spectrum management is thus the only area in
the interim developmental scheme for DBS in which the Commission has not entrusted the marketplace mechanism to arrive at an optimal solution. This is attributable to two main
considerations. First, the allocation of frequencies and orbital
positions is in large part an international issue wherein the
Commission will be bound by the terms of international agreements reached at RARC-83. The Commission is currently engaged in active preparation for the conference, having
131
requested public comment on possible negotiating positions
and having established an advisory committee to deal with
conference preparations.132 Second, orderly spectrum manage126. 47 Fed. Reg. 31575 (1982) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 100.51).

127. Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,571.
128. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976).
129. OPP STAFF REPORT ON DBS, supra note 25, at 33.
130. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 749.
131. Notice of Inquiry, 45 Fed. Reg. 51,914 (1980).
132. Id. at 51,917.
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ment requires overriding policy judgments about which communications uses will be most in the public interest as well as
nitty-gritty determinations about how best to allocate limited
spectrum space.
Under the DBS application rules, applicants may request
specific frequencies and orbital positions,'3 3 although assignments, of course, will not be made until completion of RARC83. While each applicant's preferences will be taken into account in making assignments, the Commission stated that it
may, "in acting on a particular application, restrict the number
of channels assigned to any applicant, limit or modify the area
to be served, or impose any other conditions it deems necessary."' 3 4 Furthermore, under the application rules for DBS,
"[tlhe Commission shall generally consider all frequencies
and orbital positions to be of equal value, and conflicting requests for frequencies and orbital positions will not necessarily give rise to comparative hearing rights as long as
unassigned frequencies and orbital slots remain.'135
The Commission, in its interim rulemaking for DBS, did not
address the issue of the procedure to be used in assigning frequencies among competing applicants when qualified applicants exceed available spectrum space. The overall
availability of spectrum space depends, of course, on the outcome of RARC-83 and is therefore unknown at this time. The
FCC, however, has not gone beyond assigning priority to those
were accepted for processing
nine applicants whose proposals
136
during the interim period.
The Commission's staff, however, has proposed several
methods for choosing among competing applicants, which the
staff asserts would be more efficient than the current system of
oral evidentiary hearings.'3 7 The staff concluded that the current system, involving lengthy adversarial hearings among
133. 47 Fed. Reg. 31575 (1982) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 100.13(b)).
134. Interim Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,572.
135. 47 Fed. Reg. 31575 (1982) (to be codifled at 47 C.F.R. § 100.13(b)).
136. See note 37, supra.
137. Where mutually exclusive license applications occur the Commission must
choose from among competing applicants pursuant to section 309(e) of the Communications Act of 1934. "In the past the Commission has used comparative hearings to
choose among the applicants." OPP STAFF REPORT ON DBS, supra note 25, at 35. Comparative evidentiary hearings are currently used to choose among applicants for MDS
systems. The staff estimated that the average cost of such hearings is $5,400 for the
Commission and $50,000 in legal fees for each applicant and that the average length of
the process is three years. Id. at 40.
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competing applicants for limited spectrum space, would be an
unduly expensive and cumbersome process for facilitating the
most efficient use of the spectrum assigned to DBS operations.138 Furthermore, the staff concluded that the Commission's criteria for selecting among competing applicants are
often arbitrary and subjective and often reflect FCC preferences unrelated to what the public wants. 139 Thus, the staff recommended use of paper record proceedings, lotteries or
DBS appliauctions as superior methods of choosing among
140
cants with essentially identical qualifications.
Although the staffs proposals are certainly in accord with
the free market orientation of the Commission's interim regulatory structure for DBS, the courts have generally held that
the Communications Act requires comparative hearings where
qualified applicants exceed available spectrum space and
where there are substantial and material issues of fact that will
affect the choice among potential licensees.14 ' In addition, the
FCC has recently declined to institute a lottery system for
choosing among identically qualified applicants for initial telecommunications licensees. 42 This determination, however,
was motivated by Congressional constraints on conducting a
pure lottery proceeding. The statute in question, section
309(i),1 43 only gave the Commission discretion to institute lot-

teries with substantial preference rankings. For instance the
statute gave an advantage in the lottery to, among others, minority applicants and applicants proposing unusual formats.
C. Regulatory Background
The policy of imposing minimal regulatory constraints on
138. Id.
139. Id. at 40. '[C]omparative hearings may frequently result in an arbitrary choice
among applicants. In some cases, the applicants offer such similar services that the
Commission must choose among them on the basis of differences that have little effect
on service to consumers. Applicants may propose services because they believe the
Commission looks favorably upon them, whether consumers want them or not. In

other cases, the services offered may be so different that no meaningful basis of comparison can be found."

140. Id. at 41.
141. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945); Johnston Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351 (1949).
142. Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules, 89 F.C.C.2d 257 (1982). But
see second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking under revised legislation, 47 Fed. Reg.
45046 (1982).
143. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (Supp. 1982).
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DBS is based, in large part, upon the Commission's determination that DBS will face stiff competition from other new communications technologies offering similar services. In this
regard the FCC based its analysis on a staff report prepared by
its Office of Plans and Pohcy, 1' which recommended that the
Commission set no standards in the areas of technical compatibility, signal quality, the mode of ownership of receiving
equipment, program content, prices, services offered, control of
multiple channels or cross-ownership with other media.'45
These recommendations result from four related conclusions
of the Commission's staff that: (1) DBS will face substantial
competition from cable, subscription television (STV), multipoint distribution service (MDS), video cassettes and video
discs;" (2) the more competition DBS faces the more it will be
constrained by market pressures to offer services the public
wants; 147 (3) the more competition DBS faces the more it will,
by necessity, cater to the interests of specialized audiences,
thus providing greater diversity of programming;'" (4) the
more competition DBS faces the smaller its overall revenues
and marginal profits will be, and consequently, the more burdensome would be compliance with regulations imposed by
49
the Commission.1
The Commission has adopted this approach, at least temporarily, while reserving judgment on whether the market for
DBS will develop as its staff has predicted. The FCC views the
provision of a developmental period without regulatory con144. OPP STAFF REPORT ON DBS, supra note 25.
145. Id. at 87.
146. Id. at 31-32: "The competing sources of home video programming have shown
rapid recent expansion, and are expected to continue to expand. While great demand

appears to exist for services DBS will provide, several alternative ways of satisfying it
appear certain to be available .... Given the intense competition likely, even if there
were only a single DBS operator, he would have little if any market power."

147. Id. at 88. "[D]etailed rules will be unnecessary and even counterproductive in
a market where competitors or potential competitors constrain system operators' behavior. The threat of losing customers to competitors who provide a preferred service

will cause entrepreneurs to attempt to meet consumers' preferences as closely as possible and at the lowest possible price."
148. Id. at 15. "Where the number of channels is larger, broadcasters may do better

to provide programming that appeals to the specialized tastes of some smaller segment
of the audience than to provide more middle-of-the-road programming and divide the
audience for that programming into smaller and smaller shares."
149. Id. at 88. "Imposing a minimum of technical and market restrictions on DBS
appears desirable in part because DBS seems highly risky. Major additional burdens
imposed by a regulatory agency might severely affect investors' estimates of the service's profitability and might reduce the probability that it would be initiated at all."
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straints as an opportunity to determine whether, in fact, DBS
will face a competitive market and whether that market will
result in DBS operations that are in accord with the public interest. The FCC directly acknowledged this in its interim
rulemaking for DB S, stating that "[a] n important piece of information to be gained is whether, in fact, a DBS system will
considers desirable withoperate in a manner the Commission
150
out extensive regulation."'
Although it did not explicitly do so, the Commission might
well have considered the inherent problems of introducing a
DBS system into a highly developed country, such as the
United States, which already possesses an extensive and
costly terrestrial distribution network.
One commentator stated that:
If or the developed countries, the case for the direct broadcast
satellite has never seemed particularly strong. The developed
nations already have extensive terrestrial facilities for television broadcasting; and for them, a system that uses a satellite
to broadcast directly to home receiving sets may not make economic sense. 15 '
In many respects DBS systems may have greater economic
viability, at least initially, for the less developed countries of
the world that have not yet developed elaborate terrestrial microwave transmission systems and for nations characterized
by the location of significant percentages of population in remote regions. It has been suggested that "until a reliable economic analysis balancing the cost of the necessary realignment
against the benefits of a direct broadcast network has been
made, countries already possessing extensive television distribution networks are not likely to make a rapid transition to direct broadcasting."'5 2 Nonetheless, the Commission has
decided to encourage the rapid development of DBS in an environment of uncertain receptivity by the public. The conventional terrestrial broadcasting system already in place in the
United States may have a fundamentally inhibiting and long
lasting effect on the development of DBS. The heavy competition DBS will face from entrenched conventional broadcasters
150. Interim Notice, 86 F.C.C.2d at 751.

151. A. CHAYES &P. LASKIN, DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM SATELLITES: POLICIES AND
PROBLEMS. A REPORT OF THE PANEL ON INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PoLacY 6
(1975).

152. D. SMITH,

COMMUmCATON VIA SATELLITE,

A

VISION IN RETROSPECT

214 (1976).
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may in itself be a compelling argument for maximum flexibility
in the regulatory scheme adopted for DBS.

VI
Conclusion
The FCC has often been criticized as adverse to new communications technologies.5 3 The accommodating nature of the
Commission's interim regulations for DBS would seem to belie
that criticism. The Commission is determined, at least initially, to encourage the expeditious development of DBS. This
was demonstrated in the interim rulemaking for DBS in three
major ways. First, the FCC discounted the potential impact of
DBS on the local broadcasting system 5 4 and upon the current
users of the broadcasting spectrum being set aside for DBS operations, many of whom may be displaced by the new technology. 1 5 This reflects the Commission's view that some
disruption in existing communications services is justified in
the development of new communications technologies that
have been determined to be in the overall public interest. Second, the FCC left the resolution of as many matters as possible
to the interaction of marketplace forces. Among these were
the most basic decisions of what services would be offered and
under which conventional regulatory structure DBS operations would fall."5 6 This is illustrative of the Commission's
view that DBS will face a saturated market, encountering stiff
competition from other new communications technologies. As
a result, the Commission has concluded that DBS operators
will be forced by market pressures to function in the public interest. In addition, this reflects the FCC's concern that the imposition of additional regulatory costs in a market
characterized by low marginal profits and high risk might deter
some entrepreneurs from developing DBS. Finally, the FCC
will allow the development of DBS systems to proceed without
significant regulation despite the environment of substantial
uncertainty as to the eventual market impact on DBS. This reflects the Commission's desire to develop a base of practical
153. See, e.g., Direct Broadcast to Home Satellites - Boon or Bane to Broadcasting,
Cable and the Public: A PanelDiscussion, supra note 26, at 149-157 (comments of Dr.
Nina W. Cornell).
154. See text accompanying notes 81-104, supra.
155. See text accompanying notes 51-63, supra.
156. See text accompanying notes 115-143, supra.
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experience with DBS prior to making permanent regulatory
decisions.
Much of the Commission's analysis is sound. In many respects it is impossible to know just what to expect from the
new and untried DBS technology. Further, it seems clear that
the Commission should not impede the development of what is
conceded to be a beneficial new technology merely because the
ultimate impact of DBS is not known and is largely unpredictable. The Commission should, however, take the opportunity
to integrate access and consumer responsiveness requirements into DBS systems at this early stage. Marketplace
forces alone are not adequate to insure that DBS will operate
in the overall public interest. The Commission's approach
runs the risk of creating a mediocre new communications system that is unresponsive to many segments of the viewing
public.

